An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games

Psychology, Computer Science. An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games. In this paper, we report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant.

Standard backward induction arguments lead … Expand. Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game. View 2 excerpts, references background. Highly Influential. View 12 excerpts, references background and methods. This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other … Expand. View 8 excerpts, references background and methods. Abstract This paper investigates how well a simple two-sided incomplete information game with a full support prior can be used to explain non-Nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game … Expand.

View 1 excerpt, references methods. An experimental study of the centipede game. We report on an experiment in which individuals play a version of the centipede game. In this game, two players alternately get a chance to take the larger portion of a continually escalating pile of … Expand. View 21 excerpts, references methods, background and results.

Field Centipedes. Equilibrium refinement vs. A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results.

Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency equilibrium are three key modelling principles in noncooperative game theory.

This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how … Expand. Documents: Advanced Search Include Citations. Authors: Advanced Search Include Citations. Mckelvey , Thomas R. Abstract Abstract: In this paper, we report he results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant. Keyphrases experimental study constantsum centipede game pareto improvement always take model unique nash outcome prediction centipede game nash outcome altruistic behavior nash play total payoff focal outcome induction argument pie version main feature quantal response equilibrium model experimental data non-equilibrium odifications small amount new data constant-sum game first class altruism cannot account unique nash equilibrium outcome prediction.

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